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4,7,13,17

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14337

CLIFFORD A. PRINCE, dba
PRINCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
INC, a corporation
Defendants-Respondents. :

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, INC.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the Arnold Machinery
Company to recover, under a rental agreement, rental and
attorney's fees, arising out of the rental of earth moving
equipment from a sub-contractor on a federal government
project and its bonding company.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In July of 1975, both the plaintiff-appellant and
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the defendant-respondent filed motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiff-appellant, Arnold Machinery's motion was for a partial summary judgment, not including the question of damages.
Defendant, Western Surety's Motion was for a full summary judgment.

Both motions were argued on August 12, 1975 before

the Honorable Bryant H. Croft.

On August 26, 1975, Judge

Croft handed down a memorandum decision granting Western
Surety Company's motion for summary judgment and denying
Arnold Machinery's motion. (R. 73, 74 and 75).

An Order

and Summary Judgment was signed on September 16, 1975 by
Judge Croft (R. 76 and 77).
Thereafter, the plaintiff Arnold Machinery filed
an Amended Complaint, pursuant to a stipulation with counsel
for the defendant Clifford A. Prince, dba Prince Construction
Company; in which allegations against Western Surety continued
to be present.

On the 30th day of October, 1975, the plaintiff

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Clifford A. Prince,
dba Prince Construction Company, and the same was granted,
and a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff and against
Clifford A. Prince for the rental and attorney's fee, after
hearing on November 12, 1975. Plaintiff Arnold Machinery
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seeks a reversal of Judge Croft's Order Granting Summary
Judgment in favor of Western Surety against Arnold Machinery
Company.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Western Surety Company seeks an affirmance of the Order of the District Court granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant-respondent, Western Surety
Company, or in the alternative, a ruling that the plaintiffappellant's only action is in the Feberal Courts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff first commenced its action on the 31st
day of October, 1974, in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah, Central Division in Case No. C-75-337.
That action was entitled United States of America for the use
and benefit of Arnold Machinery Company, Inc., a corporation,
Plaintiff, vs. Clifford A. Prince dba Prince Construction
Company, R. D. Tolman Construction Company, Inc., a Utah
corporation; Western Surety Company, Inc., a corporation; and
Transamerica Insurance Company, Defendants. Answers were filed
by all defendants.

In the Complaint in that action it was
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

alleged that:
30, 1973."

"The last material was furnished on October

In that action Tolman cross-claimed against

Western Surety on its bond written JJI favor of Tolman bonding
Clifford A. Prince, dba Prince Construction Company. Approximately seven (7) months later, on the 22nd day of May, 1975,
that case was dismissed, without prejudice, upon a stipulation
and agreement of all counsel.

On the 19th day of May, 1975,

plaintiff initiated this action in the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah; not including the previous
defendants R. D. Tolman Construction Company and the
Transamerica Insurance Company.
The R. C. Tolman Construction Company was the general
contractor for the construction of the Fish Lake Sanitation
System for the U. S. Forest Service at Fish Lake, Utah. As
such, it was involved in construction of a roadway in lagoons
on federal lands and subject to the requirements of the Miller
Act, 40 USCA 270 (a). Clifford A. Prince, dba Prince
Construction Company was a sub-contractor on the project in
the heavy equipment and earth moving area.

(See paragraphs

1, 2 and 3 of Complaint, R. 2, Paragraph 1 of the Answer to
Complaint of Prince, R. 6 and Answer to Request for Admissions
of Prince, R. 48 and 49.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Tolman, as general contractor for a construction
project on federal lands and for the United States Government
was required by the Miller Act, supra., to furnish a performance
and payments bond to the United States of America.

That bond

was involved in the earlier action in the Federal Court,
though that aspect of the action was dropped when the instant
case was filed.

Tolman by its sub-contract required Prince

to supply Tolman with a contract bond, which it did through
the Western Surety Company. A copy of that bond is on file
with the Court attached to the affidavit of John W. Lowe
(R. 42, 43 and 44).

That bond makes Prince, as principal,

and the Western Surety Company, as surety, "firmly bound unto
R. C. Tolman Construction Company, Inc., 130 North 600 East,
Centerville, Utah, hereinafter called the obligee, . . . ."
Western Surety Company is bound to Tolman, and Tolman alone
is listed as and called the "Obligee".
Arnold Machinery, in its Complaint, alleged that
Prince Construction rented equipment from Arnold Machinery
and failed or refused to pay the agreed rental price*

Arnold

provided such equipment, or materials up to and through
October 30, 1973. See plaintiff's Request for Admissions,
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and the Answers thereto (R. 48 and 49) . The Complaint in
this action was filed more than a year and a half thereafter,
on the 19th of May, 1975.
After some discovery, the plaintiff, Arnold Machinery
made a motion for partial summary judgment and the defendant
Western Surety made a motion for summary judgment.

Plain-

tiff's motion was based on its assertion that the action was
not limited by a one year limitation, that the state courts
have proper jurisdiction and that Arnold was a third-party
beneficiary on the bond and therefore a real party in
interest.
Both parties filed memoranda

in support of their

positions. Western Surety argued that the Arnold Machinery
Company's claim was barred on three (3) grounds.

Its memo-

randum set those forth as follows:

}

In the first place the defendant, Western
Surety contends that the action must be brought
in the Federal Court. Secondly, the cause of
action of the plaintiff is barred, even by
state law. Thirdly, the bond in question,
which was made a part of the record, runs
to the Tolman Construction Company for the
purpose of reimbursing it for any losses
it sustained as a result of a claim by materialmen or laborers". (R. 56)
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Arnold Machinery Company responded to each of those points
in a reply memorandum.

Oral arguments were held before the

Court on the 12th of August, 1975, and a Memorandum Decision
was handed down by Judge Bryant H. Croft on August 26, 1975
(R. 73, 74 and 75).

The Court's Memorandum Decision read

as follows:
The Court has under advisement plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment and defendant
Western's motion for summary judgment which
motions were argued on August 12, 1975 with
appearances as above indicated. Plaintiff's
motion is based upon the contentions that the
only issue remaining to be tried is what damages
are owing. Defendant Western contends the action
is barred by the one year statute of limitations
as well as the Miller Act.
Under Section 270 (b) of Title 40 USCA,
it is apparent that parties furnishing materials on a job covered by the Miller Act,
whether they be subcontractors or suppliers
to subcontractors, have a right of action on
the bond required by that Act. If their
rights under the act are asserted pursuant
to that statute, then the action must be
filed in the federal court within the time
required by that statute. However, the
Miller Act does not make action under that
statute the exclusive remedy to a material
or labor claim for materials or services
furnished on a federal project and if an
unpaid materialman or laborer chooses not
to sue under the act on the bond required
by the United States on a federal project,
he loses the benefit of the act and the pro-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tection of the bond required by the federal
government but not his claim or remedy unless otherwise barred. Thus, the Miller
Act is no bar to plaintiff's complaint and
its one year statute of limitations is not
applicable.
Plaintiff alleges that the state
Mechanic's Lien laws (sec. 28-1-1 et seq.)
are not applicable because Section 1 thereof
specifically provides that its provisions do
not apply to any public building, structure
or improvement and this case involves a public improvement. Plaintiff further contends
that Chapter 2 of Title 14 dealing with
mechanic's and materialmen's liens on private contract does not apply because defendant
Prince is not an owner but was a contractor;
and that Chapter 1 of said Title relating to
public contracts is not applicable because
the project did not involve furnishing work
for the state or any of its political subdivisions. Plaintiff thus contends that the
six year statute of limitations relating to
written contracts is controlling and that
the action may be maintained, or that the
four or three year statutes could apply instead of the one year statute set forth in
Section 14-2-2.
It is my opinion that the fact that the
bond required of Prince was by the general contractor Tolman, rather than by the "owner" of
the land does not take the contract outside of
the scope of Chapter 2, Title 14, and that contractors, sureties, materialmen and laborers
all are bound to meet the requirements of
sec. 14-2-1 et seq. including that of commencing
the action within one year from the date the
last materials were furnished or the labor
performed.
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This plaintiff has not done and its motion
for partial summary judgment is denied except
as otherwise indicated with respect to the
applicability of the Miller Act, and defendant
Western's motion for summary judgment of dismissal is granted.
The Court, based upon that Memorandum Decision,
entered an Order and Judgment granting Western Surety's Motion
for Summary Judgment and denying the plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (R. 76).
ARGUMENT
Defendant Western Surety in this action contends that
a number of issues interrelate in the determination of the proper
forum and of the proper statute of limitations for the case.
Defendant Western further contends that the relief sought by
the plaintiff on this appeal is inappropriate.
Because of the nature of the arrangement between the
parties, both involved in this suit and previously involved with
the bond, the nature of the relationship between the parties
to the suit is one which does fall under the controlling purview
of the Federal Miller Act and it is further one which is bound
by a one year statute of limitations regardless of its
jurisdictional base. Western Surety will herein demonstrate
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how the bond applies and, in turn, how relevant statutes
control the situation that thus exists.
POINT I
THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL BY THE APPELLANT IS
INAPPROPRIATE.
After the Western Surety Company was granted its
Summary Judgment, the plaintiff, pursuant to a stipulation
(R. 80), filed an AMENDED COMPLAINT (R. 81 and 82).

There-

after the plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against
the defendant Clifford A. Prince with supportive memoranda
and affidavits. That Motion for Summary Judgment was granted
and signed November 12, 1975 (R. 102).
The defendant Western Surety Company was not a party
to the Amended Complaint nor was it a party to the summary
judgment granted by the Court in favor of the plaintiff
against the defendant Clifford A. Prince.
Now, the appellant contends that the amounts found
by the Court in that respect should be imposed against the
defendant Western Surety Company, in spite of the fact that
the Western Surety Company was not a party, at that point in
time to the proceedings.
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The Amended Complaint includes references to a
credit memorandum which included offsets due to the defendant
Prince.

It had not yet been established or determined the

nature of those offsets^ the project they are attributable to
or whether or not they fall under the purview of the bond in
question. Additionally, it is the position of the Western
Surety Company that attorney's fees against the Western Surety
Company would be inappropriate.
Therefore, should the Court decide in favor of the
appellant on the appeal, Western Surety Company would respectfully submit that the matter should be remanded to the trial
court for determination on the issues between the parties
which were unresolved at the time of the granting of the
defendant Western Surety's Motion for Summary Judgment. At
that point in time, the plaintiff had not made a full Motion
for Summary Judgment.

The question of damages was not a part

of the plaintiff's Motion, and was specifically excluded.
POINT II
THE BOND IN QUESTION RUNS TO THE TOLMAN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY FOR THE PURPOSE OF REIMBURSING IT? FOR LOSSES IT MIGHT
SUSTAIN AS A RESULT OF CLAIMS BY MATERIALMEN OR LABORERS
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OP THE DEFENDANT CLIFFORD A. PRINCE.

l

It is the position of the Western Surety Company that
the characterization of the bond set forth in appellant's
Statement of Facts is not entirely accurate.

The bond does

not guarantee "that Prince, as sub-contractor, would 'promptly
pay all persons supplying labor or materials'"#

The language

of the bond itself is controlling and it is available in the
record (R. 43). The bond provides that Clifford A. Prince and
the Western Surety Company "are held and firmly bound unto
R. C. Tolman Company, Inc., 130 North 600 East, Centerville,
Utah, hereinafter called the Obligee, . . . "

The bond goes

on to further provide:

v

Now, therefore, the condition of this
obligation is such, that if the said Principal (Prince) shall faithfully perform said
contract and indemnify the said Obligee from
any loss, as resulting from the breech of any
of the terms and conditions thereof and
shall promptly pay all persons supplying
labor or material in the prosecution of the
work provided for in such contract, then
this obligation shall be void, otherwise
to remain in full force and effect.
The Principal (Prince) agreed to "indemnify the

said Obligee (Tolman) for losses Tolman might sustairi'. Tolman
as the appellant's brief correctly sets forth was required by
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the Miller Act, 40 USCA 270 (a), to furnish a performance and
a payments bond to the United States of America, which Tolman
furnished.

Under that bond, and provisions of the Miller Act,

a cause of action was afforded to laborers and materialmen
that would properly and timely assert their claims. The
plaintiff in this action did not timely file such a claim.
The purpose of the bond running from Prince and Western Surety
to Tolman was for the purpose of indemnifying Tolman and its
bonding company for any losses incurred by virtue of its Miller
Act obligations.
The appellant admits on page 3 of its brief that
"the action was commenced slightly more than one year after
the termination of the rental agreement".

Thus, the claims

against Tolman and Tolman's bonding company, under the Miller
Act, have been abandoned.

The plaintiff-appellant now attempts,

through a legal subterfuge, to effectuate a bond recovery in
spite of its admitted non-compliance with statutory filing
requirements.
(Point of Fact. The action which was "commenced
slightly more than one year after the termination of the
rental agreement" was the action in the federal court. It
was commenced one day after the one year termination.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This

state court action was commenced lh months after the termination of the rental agreement.)
Under the terms of the bond, Tolman was the obligee
and Tolman could recover against Clifford A. Prince and the
Western Surety Company.

The plaintiff-appellant missed their

opportunity to recover against Tolman and its bonding company
under the Miller Act.

Thus, the obligee (Tolman) has no

loss for which it needs to be indemnified.

If Arnold had

properly and timely commenced its claim (which it did not)
Tolman would have had a loss for which it could legitimately
and properly seek indemnification under the provisions of the
bond.
The bond in this instance runs only to the obligee,
Tolman.

It is unlike the bonds found in the case of Oscar E.

Chytraus Company, Inc. vs. Wasatch Furnace and Electric, Inc.,
28 Utah 2d 339, 502 P.2d 554 (1972) which ran to "the owner
and to all other persons as their interests may appear"? and
it is also different from the bond in Steel Components Company
vs. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company, 28 Utah 2d
25, 497 P.2d 646 (1972), which bond was for the protection
of persons supplying labor or material to the contractor or
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his sub-contractor.
As is pointed out in the brief of the appellant,
Tolman in this instance was required by the Miller Act to
make provisions for the protection of materialmen and laborers
by the filing of a Miller Act qualifying bond.

The function

here being performed was to provide a remedy for materialmen
and suppliers in an area where mechanics1 lien remedies were
applicable.

In the 1973 Utah case of Carlisle vs. Cox, 29 Utah

2d 136, 506 P.2d 60, the Court reasserted an observation made
in an earlier case (Rio Grande Lumber Company vs. Darke, 50
Utah 114, 167 P. 241 (1917) ) and observed that the bonding
statute tied in with the mechanics' lien law.

In the Carlisle

case the Court stated as follows:
In Rio Grande Lumber Company vs. Darke
this court observed that the bonding statute
was an auxiliary to the mechanics' lien law
and an integral part thereof and could have been
incorporated in the same chapter.
Section 38-1-7, U.C.A. 1953, (Mechanics'
Liens) provides:
. . . every person other than
the original contractor claiming
the benefit of this chapter within
sixty days after furnishing the
last material or performing the
last labor . . . must file for
record . . . a claim in writing . . . .
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Both Section 14-2-2 and 38-1-7 provide .
that certain affirmative actions must be
taken to preserve and enforce the statutory
claims thereunder within a requisite period
after the last material was furnished or
labor performed.
Tolman provided the plaintiff-appellant with an
appropriate bonding remedy.

The plaintiff-appellant failed

to properly take advantage of that remedy.

Now they are

trying to avail themselves of a secondary and independent
bond which Tolman had provided for itself should should the
plaintiff-appellant or

other materialmen properly avail them-

selves of the Miller Act bond Tolman had set up.
Appellant, in its brief, on page 19 cites the case
of Deluxe Glass Company vs. Martin, et al., 116 Utah 144, 208
P.2d 1127 (1949) in supporting the proposition that a materialman may sue the surety directly.

The Deluxe Glass case

construed a particular bond and construed that the bond, by
virtue of its language, applied to the given situation in
that case. However, that bond was a bond of a general contractor given to an owner of land.

That situation is akin

to the circumstance and the result bond which Toleman, as
general contractor, had to provide the United States of
America. Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court in the Deluxe
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Glass case, at page 151, made the following statement:
It follows that should the owner be
required to pay the debts in question, the
surety would be liable under the bond to
the owner in precisely the amount which
it is, by judgment below, required to pay
the creditors.
Thus, the Court considered the situation under which a remedy
was available by the materialmen directly against the owner
and the owner, by virtue thereof, having a remedy back
against the bond of the contractor.

In the instant case,

the materialman has no claim against Tolman and Tolman has
no claim against Prince or the Western Surety Company.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ONLY REMEDY, AS AGAINST BOND
COVERAGE, EXISTED IN THE FEDERAL COURTS UNDER THE FEDERAL
MILLER ACT.
Plaintiff admits in its brief that the project being
worked upon was a United States Forest Service Project.
Plaintiff further admits that Tolman as prime contractor
was required by the Miller Act to furnish a performance and
payment bond to the United States. Under the provisions of
the Miller Act, 40 USCA 270 (a), the plaintiff-appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

had a clear opportunity to avail itself of statutorily
required bond coverage.

Plaintiff-appellant in its brief

admits that it failed to comply with the requirements of such
coverage. As such, it is the opinion of the defendant-respondent
that the plaintiff-appellants have missed their opportunity.
In the case of Glens Falls Indemnity Company vs.
The United States of America for the use of Westinghouse
Electric Supply Company, 229 F.2d 370 (9th Cir., 1955)
portions of which are found at R. 70, 71 and 72, the United
States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled that in an
action by an electrical materialman against a sub-contractor
and a contractor and their bonding company that the materialman's proper remedy was against the contractor and its
surety and the surety's proper remedy, in turn, was against
the sub-contractor and its surety.

Judgment was rendered in

favor of the supplier against the prime contractor and its
sureties and further in favor of the prime contractor against
the sub-contractor and its sureties.
See also 117 ALR 663, annotation—subcontractors
bonds—sureties liabilities, wherein it states as follows:
As a general rule it may be stated
that if the sub-contractors' bond is conditioned for the indemnification of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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contractor for any claim of damage for
which the principle contractor may be held
liable and for the payment of which the
sub-contractor is primarily liable, would
seem that liability exists on the part
of the surety on the bond of the subcontractor to indemnify the principle contractor against any liability which may
be imposed upon him or to reimburse him
for any payment he may be required to make,
in respect of labor and materials furnished
to the sub-contractor. At page 663.
The 1954 New York case of Mcgrath vs. American Surety Company
of New York, 122 N.E. 2d 906, held that the object of a
bond given by a sub-contractor to indemnify a general contractor from liability imposed upon him by the Miller Act
for non-performance and non-payment by the sub-contractor was
to protect the general contractor, and not to enlarge the
materialmen who were adequately protected under the Miller
Act, and that, as such, a materialman had no right of action
against such a sub-contractors' bond.

In that decision, the

Court of Appeals for New York stated as follows:
If the order appealed from were correct,
it would mean that the contractor and subcontractor considered that the laborers
and materialmen of the sub-contractor were
not sufficiently protected by the Miller
Act, and consequently set out to enlarge
their rights by the procurement of the
additional bond in suit. That is manifestly
not what occurred. The rights of these
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laborers and materialmen of the sub-contractor
were definitely fixed and considered to be
protected adequately by the Miller Act,
The object in giving the bond in suit was
to protect the contractor against this
very liability imposed upon him by Federal
Law.
This conclusion is not altered by the
circumstance that the bond upon which the
action is based is conditioned upon payment
by the sub-contractor of its obligations
to laborers and materialmen. This condition
merely describes the events in which the
general contractor would have recourse
to the bond, if it were harassed by losses
due to neglect of the sub-contractor to
satisfy these obligations.
The Court went on to discuss the intention of the
parties to the sub-contractor's bond and determined that it
was "inconsistent with an intention that the plaintiff and
others in like position should have right to sue upon it.
If that intention is absent, the right to sue will be denied".
The New York Court determined that the Miller Act remedy was
the only remedy available to the materialmen in this instance
and that the purpose of the bond given by the sub-contractor
to the contractor was totally distinct.

The Court so stated as

follows:
The object in having a separate payment bond—the one in suit—was to protect
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the general contractor against the contingency which would arise if the sub-contractor's
performance bond were to become exhausted
in completing the construction work thereby
leaving the general contractor exposed to
liability under the Miller Act to unpaid
laborers or materialmen of the sub-contractor
without indemnification.
It is the view of the defendant-respondent Western Surety
Company that the fact situation in the McGrath case, supra,
is extremely simular to the situation presently before the
Court in the instant case.
An example of this proper functioning under the
Miller Act can be found in a United States Supreme Court
case of Southern Construction Company, Inc. vs. United States
for the use of Samuel J. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 9 L.2d 31,
83 S.Ct. 108 (1962).

in that case a supplier of the materials

made claims against a prime contractor and his surety the
Continental Casualty Company.

They paid the claims of the

materialmen and thereafter properly asserted those paid amounts
in a counter-claim against the sub-contractor.
Another clear example of this proper procedure under
the Miller Act can be found in the 1958 case of St. Paul Mercury
Indemnity Company vs. Wright Contracting Company, (5th Cir.)
250 F.2d 758.

In that case a prime contractor on a road con-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

struction contract involving highways and public works, paid
a processed bond claim.

Thereafter, the contractor, and not

the materialman filed suit against the bonding company of the
now defunct and bankrupt contractor.

The court there held

that the contractors claim was properly brought against the
bonding company of the sub-contractor as the bond of the subcontractor made the general contractor the obligee and as the
general contractor had suffered a loss in that it was previously
obligated to honor the claim of the materialman.
The bond in question herein like those in the Federal
Cases cited above, was designed to protect the contractor.
It was to give him a remedy over against the sub-contractor,
through indemnification (as specifically provided in the bond
language) should a laborer

or materialman properly and timely

bring an action against the contractor and its surety under
the Miller Act.

In this case, Tolman has no need to be

indemnified as the plaintiff-appellant Arnold Machinery Company
did not properly bring its Miller Act claim.
POINT IV
THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS
BARRED BY THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
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Appellent's brief in this matter essentially takes
the position that nothing applies to this fact situation. He
contends that the Miller Act does not apply, Mechanics' Lien
laws do not apply, and all other bond laws do not apply.
Counsel for the appellant apparently takes the position that
we here have a bond which is not a bond.

Accordingly, he

argues that none of the many bond juiuuuLiti^, existant under
the law, are of any weight.
The appellant again cites the case, in its brief
of Rader vs. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company of
Philadelphia, 242 F.2d 419, (2nd Cir. 1957).

That case is

not in point. At no point in that case is there any reference
to the Miller Act. The situation that existed in that case is
strongly divergent from Miller Act situations.

The purpose of

the Miller Act is to provide suppliers of labor and materials
a remedy.

It is so because no mechanics' lien is allowed

against Federal Government Property,

The laborer

or material-

man gives up his right to establish such a mechanics' lien
in favor of the surety provisions imposed by the Miller Act.
A point of distinction in the Rader case is whether or not the
surety and indemnity "inured to the benefit of the United States".
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That question is not the question which is before the Court
concerning the applicability of bonds under the Miller Act.
Citing the Rader case as the plaintiff does disregards substantial additional portions of federal practice and procedure.
The appellant in this brief has also quickly and
cursorily discarded the significance of the Mechanics1 Lien
Act mentioned above.

In the Carlisle vs. Cox case, supra., the

Utah Supreme Court in 1973 observed that bonding statutes
are auxiliary to the mechanics' lien law and an integral part
thereof.

Indeed the Court states that the bonding statute

"could have been incorporated in the same chapter". The
remedy of mechanics' and materialmen for the purpose of
establishing liens on private construction.

It, and the

bond laws, as was pointed out by the Court, required that
"certain affirmative actions must be taken to preserve and
enforce the statutory claims thereunder within the representation period after the last material was furnished or labor
performed".

Thus, bonding privileges and the mechanics1 lien

law have a cooperative effect and impact.
In addition, all bond statutes contain the imposition
of one year statutes of limitations. The Federal Miller Act
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provides for a one year statute of limitations. The state
law with reference to contractors' bonds and public contracts,
found in Sections 14-1-1 to 14-1-12, U.C.A., 1953, as amended,
provides for contractors'bonds on state projects much in the
same fashion as the Miller Act provides for them on federal
contracts, they too have a one year statute of limitations
(See Section 14-1-6).

Contractors' bonds in private contracts

are governed by Sections 14-2-1 through 14-2-3, U.C.A., 1953,
as amended.

That statute

also provides for the protection of

laborers and materialmen, Section 14-1-1 sets out the bond
conditions, and person to whom such bonds will run, and how
a cause of action accrues under such a bond.

Section

14-2-2 creates a liability for a person who fails to obtain a
bond.

Section 14-2-2 goes on to say "actions to recover on

liabilities shall be commenced within one year from the last
date that the materials were furnished or the labor performed".
Counsel for the appellant has argued, on pages 16 and 17 of
his brief, that the limitation applies to an action for <
failure to obtain a bond rather than to an action on a bond
itself. However, the Utah Supreme Court has construed

in

1972, that sentence to apply to recovery under Section 14-2-1
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as well.

Thus, any recovery on a contractors1 bond under a

private contract is governed by the one year statute of limitations.

The case so deciding was the case of Oscar E. Chytraus

Company, Inc., vs. Wasatch Furnace and Electric, Inc., 28 Utah
2d 338, 502 P.2d 554. In that case, the Court determined that
the proper time limit for proceeding on an action against a
bonding company was one year.

In that case, the Court allowed

the plaintiff to proceed against the United States Fidelity and
Guarantee Company, which had issued a performance bond on a
sub-contractor.

The UMTA Credit Union contracted with Earl

E. Walters to construct the building.

Mr. Walters contracted

with Wasatch Furnace and Electric, Inc., to provide for heating and air conditioning equipment.

Oscar E. Chytraus Company

sold the equipment to Wasatch Furnace and Electric, Inc., for
installation in the project.

In construing the statute, the

Court rejected the claim of the United States Fidelity and
Guarantee Company that it would reduce the time period for
filing the claim against it below one year as Section 14-2-1
did not specifically establish one.

In that case Section 14-2-1

was applied for the purpose of establishing the one year period.

The Court in so doing stated as follows:
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However, Section 14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953
as amended provides that actions to recover on such liability shall commence
within one year from the dates the last
labor was performed. That provision of
the statute is controlling here and the
terms of the bond which would attempt to
restrict the period for the commencement
of the action on the bond must be regarded
surplusage.
The plaintiff-appellant in this matter has argued,
when discussing the application of the Miller Act, that the
situation was not one concerned with federal law. Thereafter,
it is argued, then analysing state provisions that it was
not a state project but rather a federal project.

Judge

Croft, in his decision, rejected that logic.
Judge Croft ruled as follows:
It is my opinion that the fact that
the bond required of Prince was by the
general contract rather than by the "owner"
of the land does not take the contract
outside of the scope of Chapter 2, Title
14, and that contractors, sureties,
materialmen and laborers all are bound
to meet the requirements of Section 14-2-1,
et. seq. including that of commencing the
action within one year from the date the
last materials were furnished or the labor
performed. (R. 75)
The respondent Western Surety Company agrees with
Judge Croft in his determination that, if state laws should
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apply, the contractor here steps into the issues of an "owner".
The Utah Supreme Court has had numerous occasions
to review the one year time period provided for by Utah Bond
Statutes and has never found them unreasonably short or harsh.
See Day & NightHeating Company vs. Ruff, 19 Utah 2d 412,
432 P.2d 43 (1967)j and Lister vs. Great American Insurance
Company of Hew York, 26 Utah 2d 10, 484 P.2d 156 (1971).
Indeed in the Lister case the Court applied a one year statute
of limitations in a situation where the law provided that no
limitation could be provided for a period of less than one
year.
The agreement between Tolman and Prince requiring
the filing of the bond was a private contract.

It included

the requirement that a bond run in favor of Tolman and for
his protection.

The situation is clearly analogous and

simular to that provided for in Section 14-2-1 U.C.A., 1953,
as amended.

That section speaks specifically and directly

about the rights of materialmen and laborers to recover under
such a bond for the materials furnished or laborers performed.
The Utah Court has consistently recognized the necessity of time requirements established by statutes. This has
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been true even if they have effectuated a hardship on the party
against whom they are being construed.

See Scarborough vs.

Granite School District, Utah, 531 P.2d 480 (1975).

The

Court has also realized the necessity of strictly adhering
to such limitations in bonding situations.

In the 1966 case

of American Oil Company vs. General Contracting Corporation,
17 Utah 2d 330, 411 P.2d 486, the Court strictly construed a
90 day bonding notice requirement.

In the 1973 case of Carlisle

vs. Cox, supra, the Court strictly construed this precise
section.

That case involved the belated delivery of heat

register units for a building project.

The Court recognized

that Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 applied and barred the plaintiff's claim even though a minor portion of the materials supplied by the plaintiff were supplied within the one year time
period.
This defendant submits that the one year statute of
limitations fully applies and that the plaintiff in this action
is barred for failure to bring it timely against this defendant.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff-appellant in this action had a remedy
under the Miller Act which he had failed to avail himself
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(

of.

Since it failed to so act, Tolman, the general contractor,

has no need for the indemnification provided for in the bond
which is the subject of this suit.
The plaintiff-appellant did not file its claim within
one year. As such, it does not have a remedy against the contractor of the contractor's surety under the Miller Act; nor
does it have a cause of action against the surety of Clifford A.
Prince (the Western Surety Company) under any other provision.
Respondents contend that this action is not appropriately brought in the state courts.

It further contends that

if it is properly brought in the state courts the opinion
of Judge Croft in ruling that the one year statute of limitations
still applies i£ correct.

Respondent respectfully requests

that the opinion of Judge Croft in the Third Judicial District
y

be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^

day of
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